International Health Regulations (IHR) of the World Health Organization (WHO) are fundamental to ensure an adequate response of the international community to health emergencies such as the spread of the virus Ebola in 2014. This notwithstanding, WHO's Member States appear reluctant to comply with the IHR and in particular they violate the ban on unnecessary trade and travel restrictions. After having presented the lack of compliance with the IHR, the present article analyses the means at the disposal of the WHO for sanctioning the behaviour of its Member States, both from the perspective of WHO's internal rules and from the perspective of the law of international responsibility, evaluating if countermeasures might represent a viable solution. The conclusions will offer a broad reflection on the codification process of the rules on the responsibility of international organisations concluded by the International Law Commission in 2011.
The role of the World Health Organization and of the 2005 International Health Regulations in the management of health crises
Violations that threaten the effectiveness and credibility of WHO's actions can be traced back to certain States' negative attitudes towards the content of the 2005 IHR. Therefore, it is necessary to outline the norm features that these States violate, which will help to explain the gravity of their violations. It is equally useful to understand the IHR in the context they have been adopted. The treaty that established WHO is defined as the Organisation's "Constitution" . 16 Labels usually say little of the nature or content of an international treaty; however, as concerns the WHO, the choice of the term does not seem coincidental. In fact, on paper, the Organisation's powers described in its Constitution are broad and penetrating enough to impact Member States' behaviour significantly and to affect the international community's overall ability to avoid epidemics from spreading and help improve health standards. 17 The powers referred to above are listed in Art. 2 of the Constitution which is a very long and complex norm that lists around twenty functions for WHO to implement. 18 They range from the definition of technical standards (Letter D) to the coordination of the international community's efforts regarding health care (Letter A). Such a wide range of functions contributed to strengthening WHO's public dimension, 19 which has increasingly supported the technical one and continues to make the Organisation stand out. 20 In fact, it looks like WHO wants to be recognised as the leading international organisation for health rights, 21 appointed by a universal and vocational mandate. 22 The public implications of WHO's mandate are particularly obvious when we consider its copious production of norms -or para-norms -i. e. its ability to design and impose standards of conduct in health matters on Member States. 23 WHO's competence for drafting regulations binding upon its member states originates from Art. 21 and 22 of its Constitution. The former gives the Organisation the powers to impose regulations on certain subjects. 24 The latter closely defines the conditions under which such norms come into force and impact on the organisation's Member States obligations and, lastly, the moment in which they take legal effect.
This last point is interesting and characterises WHO's issue of norms. In fact, Art. 22 states that regulations adopted by the Organisation come into force unless Member States oppose it before a certain date. This is the procedure that Member States use to express their consent, albeit implicitly, to adhere to and abide by the norms that the Organisation has decided to adopt. 25 The IHR were adopted in 2005 following this procedure. This is the reason why there is uncertainty on their legal nature, as on one side they can be classified as WHO's binding acts, but on the other side they also possess characteristics that are typical of international treaties. 26 It is reasonable to maintain that they are unilateral acts of the WHO because they were formally adopted through a World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolution 27 grounded in Art. 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Viewed from this standpoint, it is difficult to exclude the IHR from the category of the "rules of the organisations", which includes «the constituent instruments, relevant decisions and resolutions, and established practice of the Organisation». 28 On the other hand, the are some factors that might lead to consider the IHR under a different lens. In fact, it is to be noted that States' consent, albeit even tacit, is necessary to the entry into force of the Regulations. 29 Moreover, the IHR are registered with the UN's Secretary General under Art. 102 of the UN Charter 30 and, thus, are open to the ratification to WHO Non-Member States. 31 Lastly, they allow Member States to formulate reservations. 32 To sum up, the IHR share features with common international treaties, appearing, therefore, as a set of obligations agreed between Member States. 33 We can reasonably conclude that the IHR are an act of a sui generisnature, 34 being, at the same time ,rules of the organisation and obligations arising from a treaty concluded by WHO Member States. It is probably impossible to draw a clear-cut line to choose the "right" nature of this peculiar act and as we will see later, this conclusion has an impact on the application on the rules on countermeasures.
The 2005 version of the Regulations is the second one. The first dates back to 1951, when WHO adopted the International Sanitary Regulations which later became the International Health Regulations in 1969 after its first overhaul. The model that the first version was inspired by is very different from the current one as it determined specific categories of "illnesses" and only regulated Member States' conduct in those cases. The following version of the IHR, i. e. the current one, was approved in 2005 and does not specify the type of illness, referring only to an «illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source that presents or could present significant harm to humans». 35 This means that the current version of IHR appears to be a flexible tool that could be applied in future epidemics, even though they are still unknown today. 36 Innovations in the new version of the IHR do not only concern their field of application. 37 The 2005 Regulations create a sophisticated system for handling health crises imposing a number of obligations upon Member States. In particular, the latter are obliged to set up national focal points 38 ; they also have to monitor and report events to WHO that could lead to the spreading of an epidemic 39 as well as share information. 40 More in general, States are requested to «develop, strengthen and maintain, as soon as possible but no later than five years from the entry into force of these Regulations for that State Party, the capacity to respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and public health emergencies of international concern». 41 As we mentioned earlier, these obligations have been designed to make WHO's coordination role increasingly effective, especially during particularly serious situations. 42 In fact, the WHO was assigned the power to examine information it receives from Member States 43 and to assess if conditions are met to declare the existence of a «public health emergency of international concern». 44 Should this be the case, and after having established an emergency committee, the WHO has the power to adopt temporary recommendations aimed at containing the health crisis. 45 Such recommendations are not binding, but they are of fundamental importance as they represent the tool that WHO uses to suggest the best measures for States to adopt. 46 It is no coincidence that Art. 43 of the IHR gives WHO the power to make States justify their lack of respect of these recommendations. As we will see in the following paragraph, the concrete application of Art. 43 is at the centre of the Organisation's problems.
The ban on imposing unnecessary containment measures
The purpose and scope of the IHR (2005) are rather ambitious: «to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade» 47 The article mentioned above clearly shows the rationale of the IHR. When there is the risk of an epidemic creating international level consequences, Member States have to respect the standards of conduct that are outlined in the Regulations and set out by the WHO avoiding excessive measures. The last point is crucial as it describes more than others the nature of the IHR. In fact, the IHR appear not just as "minimal" safeguards, but as limits for States to operate within. 48 To put it plainly, it is up to the WHO to set standards that balance the adoption of measures to contain health emergencies with the need to safeguard the economic and trade ties, and more in general the travel arrangements, with the Countries affected by an epidemic. 49 This appears clearly when reading another IHR norm, the already mentioned Art. 43 . 50 This complex article basically authorises Member States to adopt additional epidemic containment measures beyond those covered in WHO's own regulations and recommendations, by adopting a formula that is very similar to the "equivalent protection" devoloped in international human rights law. As long as States' measures are of equal or better effectiveness compared to the Organisation's standards, they can be considered IHR compatible. 51 However, these States are not free to adopt any measure they consider suitable to contain an epidemic. In fact, Art. 43 imposes a ban on States adopting measures that indiscreetly limit the movement of people and trade flows. 52 The relationship between the WHO and its Member States in the implementation of additional measures is similar to that characterizing the reception of international rules in domestic legal orders. In fact, the IHR allow States to choose which health measures to adopt during an epidemic, especially if they are more effective. The same regulations, however, pose a sort of "counter limit" 53 on this freedom by maintaining that such measures do not exaggeratedly affect the movement of people or goods.
The imposition of such a limit seems to be inspired by a threefold rationale. Firstly, it tends to protect those States that have been hit by the epidemic. Secondly, it operates as an incentive for States to respect their obligations to report epidemic outbreaks. Lastly, it seems to emphasise WHO's central role in defining universally accepted standards.
WHO is particularly interested by the first rationale and in fact it is invariably on the Organisation's agenda at public meetings. States hit by epidemics need many different types of aid, not only those immediately connected to containing the illness, but also -and more general -aid that helps to maintain the Country's very existence. It should not be forgotten that in the vast majority of cases -or at least in documented cases to date -serious international health crises have hit developing Countries, which are already wanting from certain points of view, in particular when they are in a post-conflict phase. It is useful to recall that the United Nations General Assembly decided to establish a task force to cope with the spread of the virus Ebola because it was concerned «about the potential reversal of the gains made by the affected countries in peacebuilding, political stability and the reconstruction of socioeconomic infrastructure in recent years». 54 Once in place, embargoes against such States would only lead to aggravating the population's living standards, which have already been compromised by the spreading of the disease. Additionally, excessive restrictions can negatively impact the movement of "health staff", who the States -and the WHO itself -have sent to try to physically contain the epidemic. 55 Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the ban on imposing excessive measures beyond those recommended by WHO represents an incentive for States to respect the obligation contained in the IHR to report epidemic events.
In fact, it is obvious that if they believed there was a risk of enduring restrictive measures that would impact trade, States would have very little incentive to report any outbreak which could potentially develop into a health crisis. 56 This would inevitably undermine the capacity of the international community as a whole to react.
The third aspect to consider concerns WHO's role. Obviously, setting universal and compulsory standards helps awarding the organisation a central role in coordinating States' action in order to avoid unilateral deviations. 57 The centrality of such a role is reinforced as derogation to such standards are permitted only on exceptional and motivated basis.
In this regard, it must be stressed that the IHR give WHO a key role in handling health crises and this represents a real change compared to the 1969 regulations. In fact, the new role of the WHO seems to characterise the current version. 58 The new international health security regime created by the 2005 version of the IHR is based on prevention and centralization of the reaction. As held by some Authors, this system builds upon the creation of a network where States are more and more interconnected through a central hub that was promptly identified in the WHO. 59 Indeed, WHO was given the specific task to coordinate and articulate the international community's response to serious international health crises, like epidemic outbreaks; as an Author pointed out, «WHO was created to be an orchestrator». 60 WHO's central role is even clearer when we consider the specific ban on imposing excessive measures or controls. The Organisation is responsibile to evaluate such measures on the basis of the scientific motivations that the adopting States must produce under the previously mentioned Art. 43. Basically, the "counter limit" that the ban on excessive measures represents can be bypassed when the interested State demonstrates that its actions are unavoidable. And it is up to the WHO to determine if a measure was unavoidable or not. Such a competence is transferred to WHO by its Member States though the acceptance of the IHR and the non-exercise of the right to contracting out from the regulations, explicitly set out in Art. 59. 61 In other words, halting States from imposing excessive or disproportionate limitations on the movement of people or goods is in line with WHO's updated role. In fact, WHO, as per its Constitution, is an international organisation equipped to coordinate States' conduct when a health crisis is declared, thus avoiding a situation where States react chaotically and independently. 62 
The violations of the ban in practice
Such an ambitious objective is not always carried through into the practical procedure of imposing excessive containment measures. But before moving on to analyse the unilateral actions undertaken by the States, it could be interesting to cite the position that the Swiss government maintained during the negotiations of the IHR in 2005. The extract under discussion is so explanatory that it is worth quoting in its entirety: «in accordance with the WHO constitution […] the State's sovereignty to choose a higher level of protection for its population than the internationally agreed minimal standard should be respected by the IHR» 63 It confirms a widespread belief among States: the adoption of the IHR must not impact on their freedom to adopt containment measures. In other words, WHO Member States consider the regulations the same way they consider the minimum protection standards: they can easily be ignored, in favour of stricter containment measures. 64 And in practice, this tendency is even clearer. During the H1N1 virus infection in 2009, it was unsure how the virus was spread, 65 but some States supported the theory that pork meat was responsible, especially if it had been minced in the US or Mexico, where it was said that the infection have originated. 66 Even though there was no scientific proof to support this theory and WHO had categorically excluded it, 67 along with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the World Organisation for Animal Health, 68 many States imposed bans on pork meat imports from States where the flu had originally started. 69 The adoption and the enforcement of such restrictive measures were discussed within the WTO. In that context emerged that the Chinese government imposed a ban on pork meat imports from the US, Mexico and Canada on the presumption that: «China was the world's biggest producer of pork and that pork was the most consumed meat product in the country». 70 The Philippines government adopted precautionary restrictions against the same States, although they removed them a few weeks later. Similar measures were also adopted by the Indonesian government. In this last case, it was not only against the three "original" states, but also against France, Spain, New Zealand and Israel. The reasons presented by Indonesia were even clearer as they were linked to the necessity to «protect its territory and industries from the virus». 71 It is also interesting to consider the ban imposed by Ghana, which justified its actions by also referring to the necessity to respond to its people's concern. 72 Apart from those already mentioned, an additional twenty countries, fourteen of them were WTO Members, also imposed commercial restrictions on Mexico.
Alongside the measures to impose strict restrictions on the import of pork meat, some Countries severely limited freedom of movement of citizens from States that had been hit by the epidemic. 73 The case of the forty Mexican citizens put in quarantine by the Chinese government is exemplary and well known. The latter government worried that the Mexicans would spread the virus in China and so once again the IHR were violated. 74 The Chinese government justified such action as necessary «to put the virus under control and safeguard people's health and hygienic safety». 75 It is interesting to note that in the official statement that announced and justified the quarantine the IHR were not even mentioned.
States' responses to the spreading Ebola virus in 2014 were not that different from the spreading of the H1N1 virus. In fact, Canada and Australia adopted measures restricting freedom of movement of citizens from States affected by the Ebola virus epidemic, including the suspension of granting visas. 76 These last measures even induced the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to request Member States to refrain from such conduct. 77 Although quarantine -and more in general individual containment measures -represent anything but a long-established States' practice in reaction to the spread of infectious diseases, 78 and to a certain extent they are still permissible, 79 it must be noted that they represent a violation of human rights of the persons whose freedom of movement is restricted. Derogations from the respect of human rights are permitted under the ICCPR and regional human rights treaties, but they must be justified by strict necessity. 80 In the vast majority of the above-mentioned cases, however, WHO has repeatedly recommended not to adopt quarantine measures as they were superfluous, hence not necessary. This happened during both the H1N1 swine flus crisis 81 and the Ebola epidemic. 82 The adoption and enforcement of containment measures and quarantine despite WHO recommendations to the contrary clearly show States' tendency to violate Art. 2 and Art. 43 of the IHR. The formal justifications that the concerned States put forward in relation to their conducts loosely hide the "real" reasons why they constantly disregard the obligation contained in the IHR: little trust in each other and in WHO recommended measures. They also reveal a revival of protectionist arguments, especially concerning the need to give effective answers to the population. 83 Going back to the rationale of the ban on excessive measures it appears quite clearly that the widespread practice of adopting and enforcing containment and quarantine measures contradicts all the three reasons that pushed toward the inclusion of such a provision. The seriousness of such measures, in fact, is understandable once we better appreciate, and recall, that they are violations of Art. 2 and Art. 43 of the IHR, which are specifically designed, as we saw in paragraph 3 of this article, to safeguard the countries hit by an epidemic, to induce States to report the spread of new diseases and, finally, to reinforce the WHO's coordinating role in managing health crises. More in general, they are rules aimed at avoiding chaotic and unilateral reactions.
The (Non) existence of a statutory sanctioning mechanism in WHO's rules
Surprisingly however, the seriousness of these violations does not correspond to an equally severe sanctioning mechanism within WHO, the Organisation that should be coordinating the international response. Actually, such a mechanism does not even exist.
It should firstly be pointed out that international organisations have little means to enforce their rules or recommendations; in fact, they can impose sanctions on Member States by basically suspending their rights to take part in the organisation's activities.
As far as the WHO is concerned, Art. 7 of its Constitution provides for the adoption of sanctions when the Organisation's Member States do not honour their financial obligations. The same article also allows WHO to adopt sanctions «in other exceptional circumstances». This expression was at the centre of an intense debate about whether or not Art. 7 was adequate to allow the Organisation to sanction its Member States for violating general international law rules. In this regard, practice exists, as the WHA discussed the possibility of sanctioning Portugal for having supported apartheid politics in Angola. It had to be decided if Art. 7 of WHO's Constitution could be considered a valid, legal foundation for WHO to sanction its own Member States for serious human rights violations. At outset of the debate, the WHA grounded in Art. 7 the exclusion of Portugal from the regional activity of the WHO in Africa. 84 Therefore, as of now, it seems that serious human rights violations represent the only exception to adopting sanctions on Member States for violating financial obligations.
Moving on to the specifics of the IHR (2005), we should refer back to Art. 56, para. 5, which reads: «in the event of a dispute between WHO and one or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of these Regulations, the matter shall be submitted to the Health Assembly». It seems that this norm could pave the way towards a mechanism, albeit rather primitive, of settling disputes, 85 which would make resorting to countermeasures both redundant and illegitimate. This same norm's clauses leading up to the fifth, state that in the case of disputes between WHO's Member States, they can refer the question to the Organisation's Director General or put it forward for arbitration. 86 We will come back to this possibility later, in paragraph 9.
We should, however, add some comments, here. The formula included in Art. 56, para. 5 of the IHR may even have been designed for this purpose. However, there is no practice that confirms its suitability for addressing disputes arising from the adoption of excessive measures. So, it is not clear how adequate the mechanism is to actually induce a State to end its illicit behaviour. On the other hand, States could -but they are not obliged to -report to the Director General the existence of a dispute about how the IHR are applied, so we should remember that they are under no obligation and could, in fact, proceed quite differently. This is the end of the overview of possible sanctioning tools available to WHO. It is clear that neither Art. 7 of the WHO Constitution nor Art. 56 of the IHR allow the Organisation to effectively act against the violations of health regulations that we have mentioned so far. The inexistence of a sanctioning mechanism available to WHO in order to keep states' activities in check is a reality. Nevertheless, it does not look like the Organisation is planning to propose statutory changes to rectify the situation. Further proof of this is in the absence of a "sanctioning problem" in the Organisation's governance's reform plans. 87 WHO's action seems to be inspired by a different rationale, based on the politics of creating incentives for States to respect the IHR and the Organisation's recommendations; a method that Alvarez described as "managerial" and inspired by a "carrot & stick" policy. 88 This is not necessarily negative. If WHO was able to get Countries to respect the IHR without having to resort to sanctions or countermeasures, it would be carrying out its duties. In fact, respecting the Organisation's rules is not necessarily connected to the threat of a sanction or, as in the case of this paper, a countermeasure. As Hart put it, respect for international law obligations does not necessarily depend on a "gunman situation", but on the persuasion that they are socially necessary and acceptable. 89 Indeed, the force deriving from social "blame and shame" should be sufficient to induce respect for international standards imposed by international organizations. 90 However, this approach is not satisfactory nowadays, or, at least, it does not seem to yield results. 91 The percentage of WHO Member States that have adjusted their own standards to IHR is still too low 92 and, as we saw earlier, imposing excessively restrictive measures on countries hit by epidemics in violation of Art. 43 is continuous.
It is no coincidence that under the previously mentioned resolution 2177, the UNSC turned to Chapter VII of the UN Charter to remind states to observe the IHR when managing the Ebola crisis. 93 Although the rapprochement between the maintenance of peace and security and the management of health crises has been generally welcomed, 94 the practice of the UNSC in this regard is inevitably a symptom of the weakness of the strategies that WHO put in place to induce compliance with the IHR. 95 At this point of the analysis the absence of a statutory sanctioning mechanism has been confirmed and, at the same time, it is also demonstrated that such an absence is part of the endemic problem of compliance with the IHR.
It is therefore useful to understand if general international law allows WHO to end the IHR violations. In the next paragraph, it will be questioned if the Organisation could (or intends to) resort to using countermeasure.
Exploring an alternative route: the adoption of countermeasures by international organisations
As we mentioned in the introduction, it cannot be excluded the adoption of countermeasures by international organisations. Caution is normally necessary when addressing this issue, but it is especially important when the relationships between international organisations and their Member States are at stake. 96 In fact, there do not seem to be compelling reasons to limit international organisations from resorting to countermeasures in cases that fall outside the relationship with their Member States. As international organisations increasingly enter international agreements with third parties, both with States or other international organisations, they have a real interest in stopping violations that could be committed against them. It seems just reasonable to admit that they can adopt any suitable measures to halt the violation of an obligation arising from such relationships. 97 In this regard, we cannot exclude either that international organisations can adopt countermeasures against third parties for violating erga omnes obligations. A clear example were sanctions that the EU adopted as part of its Common Security and Defence Policy regarding states involved in terrorist activities or those that committed serious violations of international law. 98 As we said earlier, the relationship between international organisations and their Member States seems more complex and this is, in fact, what this paper has set out to investigate. This relationship is at the centre of a historic debate that is fraught with deep divisions and undoubtedly difficult to appease. In an attempt to sum up the different doctrinal positions, some scholars believe that the relationships between international organisations and their Member States are to be exclusively regulated by each organisation's internal rules. Therefore, it is impossible for countermeasures to be implemented in international organisations' internal relationships as they are not covered under the domain of international law. 99 Other scholars, however, argue that international organisations and their Member States are autonomous in their inter se relationships, which are governed by international law. 100 Countermeasures would naturally then be applicable to international relations that can exist between these two international law subjects. 101 In this regard, the adoption of countermeasures by international organisations in the relations between them and their Member States proves that the formers are autonomous in respect of the latters. 102 In addition to these theoretical problems, it must be observed that, in practice, international organisations usually have few tools at their disposal that can classify as "countermeasures". One of this could be the suspension of a faulting State's right to vote. However, the effectiveness of this measure can be reasonably doubted. Such concern is witnessed by the recent United States' Government decision to suspend its UNESCO funding because Palestine was accepted as a Member. In fact, even now, the Congress of the United States has still not authorised UNESCO funding to start again despite its voting rights being suspended. 103 On the other side, Member States have more effective tools to induce international organizations to comply with their political will. 104 As an example, they persuade their organisations to adhere to international obligations by adopting countermeasures against them: for example, suspending funding. 105 The ILC has maintained a laic position on the issue of countermeasures, confirming that the rules concerning international organisations' responsibility -and thus the rules on countermeasures -can also be applied to international organisations and Member States where these relationships are governed by international law. In fact, Art. 10, paragraph 2 of the DARIO claims that an internationally wrongful act could result from the violation «of an international obligation that may arise for an international organisation towards its members under the rules of the organisation». Indeed, the Commentary to Art. 10 states that this provision «does not attempt to express a clear-cut view on the issue. It simply intends to say that, to the extent that an obligation arising from the rules of the organisation has to be regarded as an obligation under international law, the principles expressed in the present article apply. Breaches of obligations under the rules of the organisation are not as such breaches of obligations under international law». 106 The DARIO, therefore, could be a good point to start in understanding the state of art in international law regarding international organisations and countermeasures. Analysis must begin then with Art. 22, which dictates the conditions for an international organisation to react with countermeasures against States and other international organisations that are its Members or third parties. During discussions about this norm, debates have long analysed the possibility that international organisations adopt countermeasures against their own Members (whether they are States or other organisations) and vice versa. The ILC's efforts led to draw up two specular norms: Art. 22 and Art. 52, which respectively discipline the case of an international organisation taking countermeasures against its own Member States or when an international organisation has countermeasures placed against it.
Art. 22 is what interests us here and it is a complex norm that disciplines three situations: the international organisation's adoption of countermeasures against 1) third parties; 2) its own Members for violations of general international law; 3) its own Members when they violate the rules of the organisation. In the first situation (1), Art. 22 subordinates the countermeasures' legality to the procedural and substantial conditions that can be found in the specific part of the DARIO (4t h part, Chapter II); they are closely aligned to those in the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act (ARSIWA). In the second scenario (2), adopting countermeasures is subordinate not only to the conditions cited above but also to the circumstances that they are «not inconsistent with the rules of the organisation» and that there are not any internal remedies geared to ceasing the illegal actions. In the last scenario (3), Art. 22 ban an international organisation to react with countermeasures unless the rules of the organisation allow it. 107 So, basically, the severity of the conditions for adopting a countermeasure is considered directly proportional to the relationship between the international organisation and the subject that has had countermeasures imposed on it. To put it simple, the more the organisation is tied with the "targeted" subject, the more the conditions for adopting countermeasures are demanding.
This conclusion should not surprise: Art. 22 of the DARIO was designed to carefully consider the «special ties existing between an international organisation and its members». 108 As one Author put it, the DARIO seem to let the regulation of countermeasures to the rules of the organisations. 109 So, the default rule depends on the leges speciales of each organisation. At the very end, the ILC's approach to countermeasures seems to accommodate the criticism based on the unacceptability of the very idea that a State can adopt countermeasures against an international organisation that it is a Member of and vice versa.
The most extreme scenario -the third one, mentioned before -demonstrates this, by allowing the recourse to countermeasures for violations of the rules of the organisation only if the same rules so provide. Therefore, it is of a paramount importance to ascertain which obligation is violated, as from this evaluation depends the choice of the regime that governs the adoption of countermeasures.
However, such a determination is not an easy one.
Can WHO adopt countermeasures against its own Member States if they violate the 2005 International Health Regulations?
It is now possible to apply the results of the analysis performed in the previous paragraph to the special case of the WHO. It is crucial to look closely at this Organisation in order to understand which regime -among those mentioned in Art. 22 -governs the adoption of countermeasures. First of all, it is necessary to point out -as we did earlier 110 -that its nearly universal membership makes any reasoning about adopting countermeasures against non-member States or international organisations of no practical use. However, WHO could certainly adopt measures aimed at stopping violations of international law committed by other international organisations, although this paper cannot analyse all the conditions that these measures would be subordinated to. It rouses our interest, though, to reason about WHO's qualification as injured party and how it would demonstrate this in order to resort to countermeasures. Such a qualification could derive from the violation of any norm deriving from the various partnership agreements that WHO has with international organisations. WHO, however, could also consider itself injured if erga omnes obligations were violated, including health protection. 111 In this case, nothing would appear to stop WHO from approaching a State or international organisation in order to make them respect their obligations on the matter, 112 which in fact has already happened in other international organisations. 113 As far as the relationships between WHO and its Member States are concerned, Art. 22 of the DARIO requires a closer inspection at the rules of the organisation in order to find out if there is a ban on reacting with countermeasures and/or if WHO is explicitly allowed to react with countermeasures against its Member States.
An analysis of the WHO Constitution shows no norm banning the adoption of countermeasures or a norm explicitly giving WHO this authority. As we already saw, Art. 7 only considers the possibility for the organisation to sanction the States that do not respect their financial obligations and, in certain cases, where they are responsible for serious violations of fundamental rights. It is necessary then to investigate the existence of norms -different from the sanctioning mechanism established in Art. 7 -that entitle the WHO to react against its own Member States.
There is an interesting provision to this end in the Constitution of the Organisation that allows for the WHO Assembly to adopt «any other appropriate action to further the objective of the Organisation» (Art. 18, Letter M). This disposition apparently gives WHO sufficiently wide-ranging powers which would allow it to adopt countermeasures, although the practice demonstrates that such powers have been used through time for other reasons.
In fact, looking at the WHA's practice we notice that it has extended the organisation's competences, frequently forcing Member States' to approval. It is interesting to mention, in this regard, the outcome of a research project on the delegation of power to international organisations, which indicates that the WHO is a clear example of the predominance of the technical components -particularly within the Secretariat -that has often pushed the political organs to expand the competence of the organisation. 114 This tendency, however, does not seem to prove much as it can be justified by the implicit powers that any international organisations can resort to. 115 A more specific and interesting practice is linked to the management of the 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic, which spread up two years before the conclusion of the IHR revision process. In that period, the 1969 version of the IHR was still in force. SARS had not been included in that formulation of the IHR, which, it is worth recalling, was applicable only to a certain, and specified, number of diseases. The regulations, therefore, were not applicable and, in theory, WHO was not competent to act as a coordinator of the international response to the disease. This notwithstanding, WHO recommended not travelling to States that had been hit by the flu, which were -among the others -Hong Kong and the Chinese province of Guangdong. The WHO issued such a recommendation even though it had not reached any prior agreement with these Countries; it grounded its action on the necessity to cope with the rapid evolution of the epidemic 116 that was expanding to a growing number of areas. 117 This recommendation was the first of this kind in WHO's history and it represented a courageous attitude of the Organisation towards the prerogatives of States' sovereignty.
Such an attitude can be credited with creating a partnership between the organisation and the States' governments involved in the epidemic. The Chinese were the most involved and the network aimed at facilitating the flow of information and therefore contain the epidemic as much as possible.
This practice is certainly interesting and proof that WHO enjoys a certain margin of discretion in its actions and it could be autonomous in the adoption of measures and recommendations against its Member States that are not included in the rules of the organisation, but useful to reach its own objectives. However, the actions that the WHO performed against the will of its Member States does not qualify as countermeasures or sanctions, as it has not been recognised as being in violation of any of the Organisation's obligations owed to its Member States and because the acts are frequently not binding.
Moving to the regime created by the 2005 IHR, the WHO seems to be edging towards adopting measures as a reaction to Member States violating the IHR. In fact, some Authors maintain that Art. 43 that obliges countries to not adopt unnecessary, restrictive measures allows WHO to "name and shame" Member States that do not follow the dictates of the norm. 118 So basically, paragraph 3 of Art. 43 obliges WHO to publish the necessary information 119 concerning the measures that the concerned States adopt. Paragraph 4 gives WHO the power to ask for those measures 120 to cease, but the norm does not go further and this reflects the organisation's approach that has never adopted measures against the numerous states that have violated Art. 43.
In conclusion, the rules of the WHO -enclosed in both the Constitution and the IHR -seem to be silent on the issue of countermeasure: neither they explicitly allow, nor they ban the adoption of countermeasures on the part of the Organisation. If we tried to apply Art. 22 of the project to WHO, we would then determine that WHO cannot adopt countermeasures against its own Member States for violation of the rules of the organisation. It could, though, abstractly adopt countermeasures against Member States if they violated general international law rules.
It is crucial, then, to understand if violating the Art. 43 IHR would qualify as violations of the rules of the organisation or not because, as we saw earlier, the applicable regime on the adoption of countermeasures is radically different. In this regard, we already anticipated in paragraph two of this article that the nature of the IHR -including earlier versions -is unusual, but that it is impossible to deny that the IHR fall under the category of the rules of the organisations. Consequently, as Art. 22 DARIO dictates, the WHO may adopt countermeasures for sanctioning violations of the IHR by its Member States only insofar as the rules of the organisation so provide.
However, this is not the case.
Can WHO member states adopt countermeasures against each other?
The above conclusion suggests we should move the investigation from the rules concerning international organisations' responsibility to those concerning States' responsibility. In concrete terms, the combination of the rigidity of Art. 22 and the WHO internal rules, that make it difficult for it to adopt countermeasures, seem to lead towards another option: the adoption of countermeasures by WHO's Member States following IHR violations. In other words, as WHO lacks suitable regulations for determining resort to countermeasures, could it be for its Member States to react to a violation of the IHR? One may wonder whether WHO's Member States are allowed to resort to countermeasures in their inter se relationships to react to violations of the IHR as foreseen in the ARSIWA. 121 Such a hypothesis seems to be justified by the IHR's dual nature as both rules of the organisation and treaty obligations. 122 It is reasonable to maintain, in fact, that they do not only create States' obligations towards the WHO, but also -and maybe especially -obligations that limit Member States in their reciprocal relationships. 123 The theoretical background of this question can be traced back in the well-known debate on self-contained regimes, namely regimes that contains special rules on responsibility excluding the application of general international law. 124 Recourse to countermeasures between Member States of an international organisation, in fact, implies that there are no available means to resolve the dispute in the law of that international organisation or that the means are not effective. As seen above, Art. 56, para. 5 of the IHR establishes a rather primitive resolution mechanisms for disputes between the WHO and its Member States. However, no similar mechanisms is established in the relationships between WHO's Member States. As anticipated in paragraph five of this article, paragraphs from 1 to 4 of Art. 56, in fact, simply suggest the involvement of the WHO Director General, but do not envisage any mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms. 125 All the more, Art. 56, par. 4 indicates that: «Nothing in these Regulations shall impair the rights of States Parties under any international agreement to which they may be parties to resort to the dispute settlement mechanisms of other intergovernmental organizations or established under any international agreement.» It appears clearly that there are neither the WHO Constitution, nor the IHR can be labelled as self-contained regimes, as no dispute resolutions mechanisms are foreseen.
However, Art. 56, par. 4 of the IHR suggests that this might not be the only regime to consider. Indeed, States affected by restrictive trade measures adopted and enforced in violation of Art. 43 of the IHR brought the issue before the WTO, which hosted a debate on the matter, as we already saw in paragraph four of this article.
The debate, therefore, shifts from the WHO rules to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO, which, in Art. 23, establishes a sort of primacy of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. 126 Resort to countermeasure would therefore be limited if not prohibited by the dispute resolution mechanism established in the "WTO regime". 127 Some Authors, however, maintain that a fall-back to general international law would be permissible in cases where the WTO dispute resolution mechanism proves to be ineffective, as an ultima ratio. 128 Looking at the practice, in a joint statement by Trade Ministers of United States, Mexico and Canada issued on the 7 of May 2009 appears a clear intention to adopt retaliation measures:
«[…] we urge our trading partners to remove these restrictions on our products immediately. We will continue to follow this situation closely, and will take any steps to prevent the enforcement of unjustified measures against our exports, as appropriate» 129 (emphasis added)
Countermeasures were not adopted, but during the debate hosted by the WTO, States that had implemented restrictive measures were called to provide justification for their actions. As a consequence, China justified 130 the ban on importing pork meat on the basis of Art. 131 It is interesting to note that the States that lamented trade restrictions or bans characterized them as violations of international law rules other than the IHR, in particular rules related to trade agreements. At the same time, even the justification adduced by the States responsible of the violations were not based on the IHR or on the WHO's recommended standards. In other words, this seems to prove that States does not consider the WHO as a system capable of solving disputes among them. They disregard the fact that such restrictions amount to violations of the IHR or, at least, to disagreement on the interpretation of them that could be addressed in the terms of Art. 56 of the IHR. It appears, therefore, that States do not consider this mechanism as an option and would prefer, as the joint statement issued by United States, Mexico and Canada demonstrates, to engage the States that imposed restrictive measures on the field of other regimes or, in ultima ratio, resorting to general international law.
This hypothesis should not be underestimated and it might be considered as a solution for ensuring compliance with the IHR. However, it runs the risk of threatening the impact of WHO's actions as it would damage the delicate balance between what distinguishes the relationship between international organisations and its Member States and what acts as a guarantee of autonomy for the former compared to the latter. In other words, the "institutional veil" of the WHO will inevitably end up being pierced. 132 Another reason for adopting a cautious attitude regarding this hypothesis is the following: it would imply an acceptance of the WHO inability to ensure that its own regulations are respected, even when they are confirmed by recommendations. States would over-ride the organisation, either because it is inadequate -in this case because of its sanctioning system -or probably because there is a lack of trust. 133 Indeed, when China was called to justify the trade restrictions it stated that it: «was aware of the concerns on the issue and was actively seeking additional information for a more objective assessment of the risk». 134 The fact that a Member States of the WHO seeks for additional information for a more objective assessment of the risk after four international organisations -the WHO among them -explicitly affirmed that there was no such a risk, appears as a blunt evidence of mistrust in the international organisation that should be recognized as the orchestrator of the international response to epidemics.
Conclusions
Most of the doubts that have emerged in this article have received a negative response. It has been confirmed that there is a problem caused by persistent violations of the IHR and WHO's subsequent inability to find a remedy. It also came to light that the current state of evolution in the law of international responsibility admits that international organisations can resort to countermeasures against their own Members in only really exceptional cases.
Art. 22 of DARIO certainly appears to be a rigid norm because it greatly limits an international organisation's chances of resorting to countermeasures. The cautions that limit the adoption of countermeasures on the part of the international organisations when their Member States violate the rules of the organisation appear to be designed for sophisticated organisations with their own systems of sanctioning and dispute settlement.
It could be argued that this caution represents progressive development and not codification of international law on this point. 135 If this were the case, a more elastic regulation might be useful to better address the peculiarity of those international organisations that do not have sanctioning powers, like WHO, but might need to resort to countermeasures to induce States to comply with the standards they contribute to set.
But WHO seems to oppose this interpretation. In a comment sent to the ILC during its 61 st session, the WHO highlighted that the adoption of countermeasures should have been read in the light of the "privileged" position enjoyed by an international organisation's Member States. 136 Indeed, as we saw earlier 137 there is a clear lack of effectiveness of the measures that an international organisation could adopt against its Member States compared to those that the latter could adopt against the former.
The ineffectiveness of such measures pairs with the risk that their adoption would likely bring the international organisations to violate their own mandates. It is again the WHO, in the comments sent to the ILC, to stress that: «[t]he suspension by the organisation concerned of its activities […] would negatively affect the interests of the beneficiaries of those activities» and therefore contradict the spirit of the rules of the organisation. 138 It is quite telling that such a comment derives from the WHO. Among the wide panorama of international organisations, it is one of the fewest that elaborate standards the respect of which is demanded to Member States. Against this, one would have probably expected another attitude of the WHO towards the formulation of the DARIO's rules on countermeasures.
As this is not happened, it is reasonable to conclude that the evolution of international law regarding the adoption of countermeasures by international organisations perfectly reflects the political will of the same international organisations and of their Member States; in other words, it seems to reflect practice and opinion juris. The codification efforts of the ILC on the responsibility of international organisations has led to the elaboration of strict and demanding conditions for the adoption of countermeasures, which are objectively difficult to satisfy. WHO's attitude seems to confirm that the direction the ILC took corresponds to the state of the art. The relationship between international organisations and their Member States is disciplined by the rules of the organisations and resort to countermeasure makes no exception.
The lack of compliance with the 2005 IHR, therefore, can only be tackled and solved by WHO's Member State through an expansion of the Organisation's powers or competence leading to the establishment of a sanctioning mechanism. 139 It seems obvious, however, that States looks reluctant about the idea of giving WHO new and greater powers, maybe even institutionalising resorting to countermeasures. On the other side, WHO does not seem to push too much for a similar reform. This is evident by the absence of this issue in the organisation's governance reform proposal -as we mentioned earlier. 140 There seems to be a sort of implicit "non-aggression pact" in force between the WHO and its Member States. The terms of this "pact" are emblematically summarized in a speech delivered by the then Director General Halfdan Mahler in 1983. This speech was made during the phase described previously 141 where WHO was under pressure from its own technical board, which had persuaded the WHA to extend its authority, albeit excessively:
«[i]f we allow ourselves to be lured astray into fields beyond our constitutional competences I am afraid we will find ourselves in those very minefields that we have trying to avoid in the interest first and foremost of the deprived peoples living in the Third World. None of us would want to blow up our Organisation, nor would we want to lose the tremendous prestige we have gained as an Organisation of 160 Member States, able to cooperate with one another for the health of people everywhere without distinction of race, religion, political beliefs, social or economic development -indeed, what our very Constitution demands of us» 142 Normally such reasoning is justified by referring to international organisations that have limited mandates or powers to act. In such cases, Members States can control the organisations' conduct through the rules of the organisations that normally discipline its powers very carefully. 143 The level of detail that characterizes the conferral of powers to this kind of organisations leaves little space for discussing an extension of the organisations' powers. Although this model simply reflects an extreme interpretation of functionalism, it is influenced by a clear political choice of Member States not to leave to international organisations room for increasing their powers. 144 However, as we explained in the introduction, 145 WHO is not an organisation with limited powers. In fact, it has the competence to adopt rules and standard that its Member States are bound to respect; moreover, as seen above, it sometimes acted with a high degree of autonomy, in particular in the period that preceded the negotiation of the 2005 IHR. 146 Indeed, the mandatory character of the IHR, both the actual version and the earlier ones, reflects an "anti-contractualist" attitude of the WHO towards its Member States. 147 Potentially, then, WHO would need to be tenacious when following its own mandate, which might include creating dialogue with its Member States. In this last case, WHO should be able to make the States respect certain standards of conduct, regardless of their desire to do so or not.
But this does not happen and this inertia is helped by reading and analysing the rules on countermeasures in the DARIO. It is also helped by the behaviour of Member States, which label the violations of the IHR as violations of rules of general international law, or treaties other than then those concluded within WHO, and seem tempted to activate dispute resolution mechanisms elsewhere or, in ultima ratio, to resort to countermeasures in their inter se relationship. 148 In a recent piece, Jan Klabbers concludes that the law of international organisations is fundamentally conservative. It is more geared to protecting the organisations than efficiently regulating their activities and helping solve their problems. 149 This reflection was developed by looking at the relationships between the organisations and third parties, but the case made in this article shows how it can also be applied to relationships between the organisations and their Member States.
Whereas this might help to avoid the "great escape" of States from international organisations, it is hardly useful for giving the latter enough means to pursue their mandates.
